Wang Yiwei/Text Take a glimpse and know the whole thing.
As of February 20, Biden took office as President of the United States for a full month. Through the inductive analysis of scattered information this month, we can see the outline of the evolution of the US government’s China policy in the next four years.
Specific to the current stage, the Biden administration’s China strategy mainly has the following three characteristics.
First, I am afraid of Trump and dare not easily change the radical practices of the previous US government.
Although Lao Te is gone, Yu Wei is still there. The Trump administration has left two “legacy” in its relations with China. One is a trade war with tariff increases as the main means, and the other is the first phase of the Sino-US economic and trade agreement. Regarding the trade war, although some American think tanks and scholars have concluded through research, the tax increase has not achieved the expected effect, but instead has damaged American employment and economic development to a certain extent. However, the damage to the United States is hidden. Customs has received more tariffs, but it is real money. If the Biden administration rashly cancels or lowers tariffs, with Trump’s stalking nature, counterattacks, the Biden team may be difficult to resist.
As for the first-stage economic and trade agreement, for the Biden administration, this “legacy” is almost all bullish. It is important to note that people in the world have often noticed China’s commitment to the purchase amount of U.S. goods and services in the first phase of the economic and trade agreement, but failed to notice that this agreement is a comprehensive document and purchases from the U.S. are only part of it. , And a large amount of content related to intellectual property rights, technology transfer, financial services, macroeconomic policies, exchange rate issues, and transparency.
Under the background that Trump is very likely to make a comeback in 2024, how to make full use of the beneficial part of Trump’s “legacy” to China while not being counter-utilized by Trump is indeed very brainstorming. Therefore, the measures Biden is taking now is to remain unchanged, neither shrinking (tariffs) nor promoting (economic and trade agreements).
Second, re-characterize China-US relations, from confrontation to competition.
This is a major China policy signal from the Biden administration.
Whether it is the previous Trump administration or many think tanks, experts and scholars in the United States, many people have long regarded China as the number one opponent of the United States. Based on the qualitative nature of this relationship, the United States’ China policy is confrontation, or head-on. Trump is the first U.S. president to confront China after the end of the Cold War. Although this confrontation is mainly embodied in the fields of economy and trade, science and technology, and ideology, it has not yet risen to the level of military and hot wars. However, after four years of competition, China and the United States have each recognized their own strengths, and each knows where they are unable to do so. The large-scale shortcomings in the field of science and technology force China to make up its mind and pursue it. Killing one thousand and hurting one hundred and eight hundred has also made the United States realize that it cannot and cannot continue to confront.
In confrontation, either one side destroys the other side or both loses, while competition can achieve a win-win situation. From this point of view, Biden characterizes the current administration’s China relationship as competition, and believes that China and the United States will have fierce competition, which is to follow the trend.
Third, the research on China policy is a fake shot, and Biden needs time to coordinate internally.
Some scholars believe that the Biden administration’s relations with China at this stage are “clear in tactics and vague in strategy.” One basis is that Biden asked the US Department of Defense to spend four months to conduct research and issue a report on China’s strategy. This view seems to have some truth, because the Biden administration has indeed not issued a comprehensive China policy outline that can guide the next four years, so it requires all departments to concentrate time, concentrate on research, and then integrate all parties. Point of view, promulgated a supreme guiding principle.
But this view is not accurate.
In my opinion, after the end of the Cold War, the United States’ China policy has always been “a clear strategy and chaotic tactics.” Regarding the clarity of strategy, the author will have the opportunity to discuss in detail with readers in the future. This time I will mainly talk about “tactical confusion”.
Let me give you an example. On December 1, 2018, relevant Canadian authorities illegally detained Huawei Princess Meng Wanzhou at the request of the United States. On the same day, President Xi Jinping and President Trump met in Buenos Aires, the capital of Argentina. Some people believe that this was done deliberately by Trump, just to embarrass China. Trump is too bad. But there is also information that Trump has no prior knowledge of the detention of Princess Huawei.
The author tends to agree with the latter statement, Trump does not know.
This involves the US “tactical confusion.”
In Washington politics, there is a proper noun “Deep State”. There is no uniform translation of this term. Some people translate it into “deep government”, while others translate it into “shadow government” or “deep state.” It can be said that if the U.S. government is divided into two layers, the upper layer is the elected president and the heads of various departments nominated and appointed by the president. These people are basically changed every four years. same. And the next level is the officials and civil servants who work in Washington all year round and hold real power in various departments. These officials are deeply rooted in Washington politics and have a strong influence on the national economy and the people’s livelihood. In some cases, even the President of the United States and the heads of central departments have nothing to do with them. This group of people, this group of people who have real power and have been rooted in politics all the year round, are the “Deep State.”
This batch of “Deep State” has become a special group of Washington politics. They think highly of themselves and pretentiously. If the president is good, they will happily cooperate with him. If the president is bad, they will sneer in private. A Chinese scholar once revealed that he attended a “Deep State” gathering. When someone mentioned Trump at the gathering, the whole audience burst into laughter. In other words, they look down on Trump at all, even though he later became president. Therefore, the princesses of Huawei say that they will be arrested. They don’t care that the leaders of the two countries are holding important meetings.
What Biden has to do now is to let the “Deep State” in Washington’s political arena unify their thinking and understanding of their relations with China, and then achieve the same pace. To achieve this goal, he gave four months or more.
This is a difficult job.Return to Sohu to see more
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